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Executive Summary 
The EU is at present suspended in a leadership limbo, with the new Commission President nominated but not 
yet approved. Moreover, until a second referendum is held in Ireland, uncertainty over the institutional 
framework will persist. So far, attention has focused mainly on who should be the next President of the EU or 
the European Commission. However, given the immense internal and external challenges facing the EU, the 
key issue should be what to do. 
This CEPS Policy Brief provides an action plan for whoever will sit at the helm of the Union, and in primis, at 
the helm of the Commission. Setting priorities means concentrating on a limited number of fields. Therefore 
CEPS research staff has identified priorities in four selected policy fields where concrete action is needed 
immediately: reform of financial sector regulation and oversight, climate change and energy policy, Justice and 
Home Affairs and the Common Foreign and Security Policy.  
These fields are crucial to fostering a recovery of the EU economy and allowing the EU to become a real actor 
on the international scene. Taking the actions proposed will stabilise the economy and set the EU on the right 
course out of its current limbo, allowing it to become a more relevant actor on the global scene as well. 
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1. Introduction 
Daniel Gros & Julia De Clerck-
Sachsse 
As the EU administration is entering a new five-year 
term, it is faced with a number of tasks of crucial 
importance. It needs to find an exit strategy from the 
economic and financial crisis, it will have to assert 
itself as a leader in negotiations on climate change, 
it is grappling with a more unified approach to 
immigration and it needs to rethink the way it 
presents itself on the international scene. At the 
same time, the EU still finds itself in institutional 
limbo, while the precise rules of the future 
functioning of the EU and its leadership remain to 
be finalised. Nevertheless, there is no time for 
complacency. A lot of ink has already been spilled 
on the perceived lack of EU leadership on the 
international scene. Rather than more talk of crisis, 
however, what the EU needs now is a concrete 
programme to set it back on track to tackle the 
immediate challenges it faces. 
To be sure, the most severe challenges facing the 
EU today – the economic crisis, the effects of 
climate change, illegal immigration and 
international peace and security – can only be 
addressed on a global scale. The EU certainly 
cannot resolve them alone. Yet, in all of these policy 
fields, concerted action within the framework of the 
EU is already an important step towards a more 
cohesive global strategy. In order to remain a 
relevant actor on the international scene, therefore, 
the EU must set clear priorities and focus on those 
fields where it can actually make a difference. In 
particular action is required in four areas: 
Finding a way out of the economic and financial 
crisis must be at the top of the EU agenda. The two 
priorities in this field are to: a) preserve both the 
single market and the stability of the financial 
sector, and b) ensure the application of the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SPG). In this latter 
task, the Commission faces a considerable challenge 
given that the large rescue and stimulus packages 
passed in order to stabilise the banking sector and 
national economies have been organised at the 
national level and fly in the face of efforts to 
balance the budget. While the Commission’s 
capacity regarding the SGP is limited and the short-
term economic outlook remains so uncertain, at this 
point it would be premature to push for a rapid 
return to an orthodox fiscal policy. In the area of 
financial market regulation, however, the role of the 
Commission is essential. Many initiatives are being 
pursued at the same time, but what is missing is a 
holistic approach to dealing with the economic and 
financial crisis. The Commission is busy 
implementing as rapidly as possible the 
recommendations of the de Larosière Report as 
agreed in the European Council of June, and by 
September, the Commission should already have 
drafted concrete legislative proposals. But this is not 
enough. The Commission should complement these 
measures that deal essentially with supervision of 
the financial sector with concrete proposals 
concerning the problems of ‘burden-sharing’ 
through the creation of a European Deposit 
Insurance scheme and new measures for winding up 
insolvent banks. Moreover, the Commission needs 
to have a clear and tough line on state aids in the 
banking sector, where it is important now to 
separate the viable from the non-viable institutions 
to avoid a prolongation of the problems in this 
sector by allowing governments to keep so-called 
‘zombie banks’ alive forever.
1  
The Copenhagen Summit in December 2009 makes 
the need for a clear programme on how to combat 
the problems of Climate Change and Energy 
supply, if it wants to serve as a model in this field. 
A key sector in this regard will be transport – for 
97% of the sector still depends on fossil fuels and 
therefore produces large amounts of greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions. Without targeting emissions in 
the transport sector it is unlikely that the EU’s 
emissions targets will be met. In order to do so, a 
transport and climate change package should be 
adopted to set the Union on track to decarbonise the 
transport sector and thereby take a crucial step 
towards reaching the emissions targets it has set for 
itself. This would imply reviewing the current EU 
tax regime for fuels and rethinking the current 
transport infrastructure, in particular by increasing 
the share of low-carbon electricity in road transport. 
Reducing emissions in the fields of international 
aviation and maritime transport will also play an 
important role. While R&D and new technologies 
                                                      
1 This necessity to distinguish between viable and non-
viable banks is completely independent from the issue of 
whether savings and cooperative banks should be 
transformed into joint stock companies. See a recent 
CEPS study on this issue (Ayadi et al., 2009).  
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will be at the heart of such efforts, demand-side 
management will also be crucial to this task. 
Justice and Home Affairs have also become an 
increasingly important issue on the EU policy 
agenda as the Union’s competences have increased 
in this field (and will continue to do so if the Lisbon 
Treaty is ratified). So far the EU’s JHA agenda has 
been driven by the logic of a ‘Europe of results’. 
Rapidity and urgency however are often difficult to 
reconcile with proper protection of fundamental 
rights and standards of rule of law. This is why a 
high quality and independent (ex post) EU 
evaluation mechanism focusing not only on the 
correct and timely transposition of EU laws at 
national level but also on general rules of law and 
good administration standards (such as the quality 
of judicial and asylum systems) remains crucial. 
This mechanism would ensure that a Europe of 
results goes hand in hand with a Europe of Rights 
and Justice. Another important step in this direction 
is the EU’s policy towards immigration. With few 
related European measures adopted so far, legal 
migration and the rights of migrants should remain 
high on the next Commission’s agenda. Among the 
five measures announced in the 2005 Migration 
Policy Plan, only one – the least controversial on 
highly qualified employment (EU Blue Card) – has 
been agreed to. In order to develop this policy 
domain further, the Commission’s idea to create a 
single instrument is most welcome. Adoption of an 
Immigration Code to guarantee a “clear, 
transparent and equitable approach” to migration 
could constitute a crucial step towards a clearer and 
non-fragmented framework on migrants’ rights. For 
that to happen, this framework should allow for the 
incorporation of human rights and guarantees for all 
third country nationals migrating and residing to the 
EU (including undocumented migrants). Such a 
Code should also not leave the door open for 
lowering existing standards and rights in EU 
immigration law.  
Last but not least, the EU’s role in establishing a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is 
as relevant as ever with conflicts from Afghanistan 
to the Middle East process and Iran calling for 
concerted action. The proposed changes in the 
Lisbon Treaty, however, will necessitate a general 
rethink and overhaul of the institutional 
structure for the CFSP. The creation of the EU’s 
External Action Service (EAS) would be the first 
immediate step. The Commission should present a 
detailed blueprint for the organisational structure 
and staffing needs of the EAS. Moreover, 
arrangements for creating posts for several deputies 
under the new Vice President of the Commission 
(the High Representative for the Union’s Foreign, 
Security and Defence Policy) will have to be made. 
A logical step following from these institutional 
innovations would be to also rethink the way in 
which the EU is represented (or not) both in third 
countries and in international institutions. For 
example, does the Commission propose to create 
common diplomatic and consular services in at least 
some countries of limited importance where not all 
member countries are represented? Is there any new 
thinking on the coordination/common representation 
of the EU in the UN and its agencies? At a 
minimum, the representation of member countries 
(and especially of those in the eurozone) should be 
reduced in the IMF and international financial 
institutions with the aim of having a unified euro 
area representation by the end of the life of this 
Parliament. 
2. Financial markets and the economy – 
Time to define a holistic approach to 
the crisis 
Daniel Gros & Karel Lannoo 
The challenge for the incoming European 
Commission will be to define an integrated response 
to the financial/economic crisis, combining a 
number of different elements into one coherent 
policy. A vast number of specific legislative 
proposals are at varying stages of advancement (on 
ratings agencies, hedge funds, capital adequacy, 
etc.). They are important in their own right, but are 
not of systemic importance. There are two 
systemically important issues on which the 
Commission seems to be concentrating: i) 
implementation of the de Larosière proposals as 
approved by the European Council of June and ii) 
the need to find the right time to bring fiscal policy 
back into the parameters defined by the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP). These two elements are 
important, but not sufficient in themselves. 
Regarding the SGP, the influence of the 
Commission is limited and the short-term economic 
outlook remains so uncertain that at this point it is 
premature to push for a rapid return to a Maastricht-
like, orthodox approach to fiscal policy. However, 
in the area of financial market regulation, the role of 
the Commission is essential. Here it is not enough to 
just implement de Larosière agenda. 
Four key issues need to be addressed regarding 
financial markets. 
First, there is general agreement that de Larosière 
proposals should be implemented as soon as 
possible. The Commission is committed to 
presenting in autumn the necessary draft legislation. 
The guiding aim in doing so should be to articulate 
as clearly as possible the objectives, functions, 
organisation, governance and funding of the new  
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supervisory entities – the European Supervisory 
Authorities (ESAs) and the European Systemic Risk 
Council (ESRC). Another key element will be to 
ensure the proper cooperation of these new entities 
with the existing structures. At the centre of the new 
structure, owing to its status and composition, will 
be the Steering Committee of the ESRC, composed 
of three central bankers (ESCB), three supervisors 
(ESA’s chairs), a European Commission member 
and a delegate of European financial ministers. The 
structure and decision-making mode of this Steering 
Committee need to be carefully defined and the 
Commission and the European Central Bank should 
prepare an ambitious initial work programme as this 
will set the tone for this new entity. But this is not 
enough; the other measures are needed. 
A second element, which has so far received too 
little attention, is deposit insurance. It is not enough 
to just strengthen the existing patchwork of national 
deposit insurance schemes. What is needed now is a 
truly European deposit protection system 
administered by a European Deposit Insurance 
Corporation that insures deposits in cross-border 
institutions. Without such a European scheme, small 
countries will no longer be able to host large banks, 
and national supervisors will constantly put pressure 
on banks to transform branches into subsidiaries, 
thus destroying the meaning of the European 
passport and the single market. The Commission 
needs to publish as soon as possible concrete 
proposals for such a European Deposit Insurance 
scheme. Such a new system should bring back 
market discipline in the European financial system 
and re-establish confidence because it would avoid 
the problems that arose in the case of the Icelandic 
banks. 
Third, the Commission should work on proposals 
for a European-wide bank resolution and liquidation 
regime. This is urgently needed because at present it 
is exceedingly difficult to close down banks without 
running into the legal problems (and the systemic 
impact) a formal insolvency would have. 
(Moreover, only very few member countries have 
such a scheme.) 
A fourth issue to be addressed is the question of 
state aids and bank stress tests. The ground needs to 
be prepared first to start limiting and then rolling 
back state aids in the banking sector on a 
coordinated euro-wide and, preferably also EU-wide 
basis. So far, around 40% of the guarantees and the 
recapitalisation allowances for the banking sector 
have been used, indicating that the situation has 
been stabilised. The Commission should establish 
clear criteria under which the unused portions 
should be frozen so that new aid for banks in 
difficulty would be subject to normal state aid rules. 
Having a proper framework for winding up banks 
without formal bankruptcy procedures would of 
course be extremely important at this stage. 
All these elements need to be put together in a 
holistic approach. The Commission should set out in 
a strategic paper on financial markets its overall 
vision of how these different aspects can be 
combined in a coherent manner. Naturally these 
initiatives should be coordinated with the ECB on a 
number of aspects (for example, liquidity facilities 
for the banking sector, lender of last resort issues, 
etc.).  
Beyond policy, success in overcoming the current 
crisis also has a clear institutional and personal 
dimension: reaching agreement and later 
implementing this holistic approach will require 
close cooperation of a number of Commissioners 
(with responsibility over DGs Markt, COMP, 
ECFIN, etc.) and will require a collegial approach, 
under the leadership of the Commission President.  
Finally, one should not forget that the incoming 
Commission already faces a huge task in restoring 
the reputation of the EU (and the Commission) as an 
effective regulator for financial markets. Rightly or 
wrongly, the Barroso I Commission was associated 
with the concepts of ‘self regulation’ and ‘regulatory 
pause’. In hindsight, it is clear that this was a 
strategic error of the first order. Correcting this 
reputation will also be a matter of finding the right 
personalities for the key portfolios and choosing the 
right structures to define and implement these 
policies.  
3. Transport and climate policies – Time 
to decarbonise transport in Europe 
Christian Egenhofer & Arno Behrens 
In order to come closer to reaching its greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions targets by 2020, the EU 
urgently needs a new transport and climate package. 
The transport sector is not only vital for European 
integration, it also constitutes an important 
component of the European economy. The sector 
contributes some 7% of GDP and more than 5% of 
total employment in the EU. Progressive European 
integration, notably via successive waves of 
enlargement, has lead to a substantial increase in 
transport volumes in recent years. On average, 
passenger transport increased by 1.7% annually 
since 1995 – mainly driven by air and road transport 
– while freight transport increased by 2.7% over the 
same period – mainly driven my road and sea 
transport. These developments have lead to an 
increasing recognition of the negative side-effects of 
mass transportation in Europe, including 
deterioration of infrastructure, misuse of land, 
congestion, air and noise pollution, injuries and  
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deaths, as well as substantial amounts of GHG 
emissions. The latter is of particular importance in 
the context of the EU’s global climate leadership. 
Failure to address GHG emissions in transport will 
not only jeopardise recently adopted EU emissions 
reduction targets; it would also hinder the industrial 
transformation of the transport sector. 
While GHG emissions have decreased in all sectors 
of the European economy since 1990, transport was 
the only sector that experienced continuous growth 
in emissions, which increased by some 36% in the 
period between 1990 and 2006.
2 As a result, the 
European transport sector was responsible for 
almost one-quarter of all EU GHG emissions in 
2006. The fastest-growing modes of transport were 
civil aviation (+89%) and navigation (+51%), while 
in absolute terms the largest increase was in road 
transport (+29%). The latter continues to contribute 
the bulk (71%) of transport-generated GHG 
emissions and is responsible for some 17% of total 
EU GHG emissions. These figures indicate the 
challenge posed by the transport sector in the EU’s 
efforts to reduce GHG emissions. In order to meet 
the 2°C climate change target by 2020, emissions 
from road transport need to decrease in absolute 
terms while increases in emissions in the aviation 
and maritime modes need to be halted. In the longer 
term, i.e. until 2050, emissions from the transport 
sector need to decrease by up to 80% in order to 
achieve the global emissions reduction targets. 
Achieving these objectives will require a dramatic 
shift in the way people travel and in the way we 
move goods.  
Reducing transport emissions will have additional 
benefits in terms of security of energy supplies. The 
transport sector today depends on hydrocarbons for 
97% of its fuels, and mainly on oil. Biofuels and 
other renewables will not be enough to address this 
vulnerability. The overall EU transport demand is 
projected to increase to such an extent – 18% by 
2020, according to the IEA (2008) – that the EU 
target of replacing 10% of transport fuel use with 
renewable energy sources can only moderately 
reduce European dependence on oil. In a time where 
oil imports will continue to replace declining 
domestic oil production and import dependence will 
increase, a low-carbon transport strategy seems 
unavoidable. 
A transport revolution 
While the EU Common Transport Policy has 
“assisted social and economic cohesion and 
promoted competitiveness of European industry, 
therefore contributing significantly to the Lisbon 
                                                      
2 All figures include international bunkers, i.e. 
international traffic departing from the EU. 
Agenda for Growth and Jobs” (European 
Commission, 2009), there has been little progress in 
designing an integrated response to rising GHG 
emissions, security of energy supply issues and the 
transport sector’s innovation challenge. The 
transport-related elements of the energy and climate 
change policy (including the renewables Directive, 
the clean cars Directive and the fuel quality 
Directive) represent a step in the right direction but 
fall significantly short of an integrated strategy 
leading to a low-carbon transport sector. To do this, 
the new Commission should draw up a ‘transport 
and climate change package’ comparable to the 
recent energy and climate change package. This 
package must give answers to fundamental strategic 
questions about what a sustainable EU transport 
system would look like and how it can be achieved. 
In addition, it should comment on the cost-
effectiveness of alternative low-carbon transport 
options with the aim of building political consensus 
for their implementation. 
The transport and climate package needs to review 
of a number of policies at EU but also member state 
level. One such policy area is taxation, which will 
need to treat comparable fuels in a similar way. The 
tax exemption of aviation fuels, in the fastest-
growing mode of transport, will thus need to be 
reconsidered. Another central policy area will be 
infrastructure. Upgraded and new transport 
infrastructure will be required to master the 
transition to a low-carbon economy in much the 
same way as smart grids will become the backbone 
for the energy sector’s transition. In fact, road 
transport infrastructure and electricity grids will 
need to become more closely connected because 
decarbonisation of road transportation will not be 
possible without an increasing share of low-carbon 
electricity in transport. The decarbonisation of the 
power sector is thus a prerequisite for 
decarbonisation of road transport. Although it looks 
likely that future road transport will rely on 
electricity, this is not to say that other alternatives to 
conventional combustion engines (e.g. hydrogen) 
should not be looked at. The largest challenge for 
decarbonising the transport sector will be in 
international aviation and maritime transport 
because of a lack of technological alternatives for 
the near future. Biofuels will need to play an 
increasing role, together with energy efficiency 
measures and demand reductions. In addition, the 
expansion of the high-speed train network may help 
in the substitution of air and road travel.  
R&D and technology will be at the heart of these 
efforts. On the one hand, technologies will need to 
be tested. On the other, only deployment ensures 
that costs decrease. The new transport and climate 
package should thus introduce technology  
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deployment targets, for example in the area of 
advanced car technologies. This could relate to the 
vehicles themselves (e.g. a certain share of the 
vehicle fleet needs to be carbon neutral), as well as 
to innovative infrastructure projects (e.g. minimum 
requirements for electricity infrastructure for cars). 
To stimulate technological innovation, a number of 
demonstration projects may be considered aimed at 
using advanced telematics technology in urban 
transport to increase efficiency, reduce congestion, 
reduce GHG emissions and increase 
competitiveness through advanced technologies. 
Such systems can now be based on the GALILEO 
global navigation satellite system. Mandatory large-
scale demonstration projects can be justified 
because they play an important role in bringing 
down the costs of the equipment.  
It should be noted, however, that technology alone 
will not be enough to bring down emissions, and 
demand side management, including infrastructure 
pricing, will also need to be given consideration in 
the proposed transport and climate package. 
Internalising the full environmental and social costs 
according to the polluter-pays principle together 
with better data and information will be crucial in 
influencing consumers’ behaviour.  
The transition towards a low-carbon transport 
system in the EU is a European task. One or several 
member states will not be able to do it on their own. 
If the Commission is serious about pushing its 
climate and energy agenda, it should start working 
on the transport and climate package without delay. 
4. JHA – Time to reconcile a ‘Europe of 
Results’ with a ‘Europe of Rights and 
Justice’ 
Elspeth Guild, Sergio Carrera & Anaïs 
Faure Atger 
The area of Justice and Home Affairs has been one 
of the most dynamic policy fields in the EU in 
recent years. Indeed this surge of activity is 
welcome in a field where a coordinated EU 
approach has become crucial. However, in order to 
ensure that an EU-wide Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice (AFSJ) takes account of citizens’ needs 
as well as the need for effective policy development, 
the EU must focus on establishing effective EU 
evaluation mechanisms as well as adopting an 
instrument for addressing questions regarding legal 
migration of third country nationals in the form of 




An AFSJ and a ‘Europe of Results’ 
The EU’s AFSJ has been driven by the logic of a 
‘Europe of results’.
3 Since 2004, these policies have 
been among the most dynamic in terms of 
legislative outputs but also of soft-law production 
and cooperation. AFSJ-related policies portend deep 
repercussions for the liberty and security of the 
individual.  Rapidity and urgency are often 
difficult to reconcile with proper protection of 
fundamental rights and rule of law. This liberal 
deficit becomes most relevant when taking into 
account the presumption that the way in which the 
EU legal system functions guarantees full 
compliance with the rule of law and the principles 
of fundamental rights.  
Before the European Commission published its 
Communication COM(2009) 262 on an “Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice serving the Citizen” 
of June 2009,
4 we had already argued that the EU 
lacked high quality and independent (ex post) EU 
evaluation mechanisms focusing not only on the 
correct and timely transposition of EU laws at 
national level, but also on practical support 
measures and the assessment of more structural and 
horizontal questions such as those of good 
administration and quality of the judicial systems.
5 
The Commission’s Communication COM(2009) 
262 identified evaluation tools to be one of the 
central priorities for the future AFSJ, but this has 
not been accompanied by a tangible strategy as to 
how to implement them in practice. Any proposal 
needs to avoid duplication of existing (dispersed) 
EU evaluation systems as well as those for instance 
of the Council of Europe. 
It would be also important that any EU evaluation 
system would actively involve not only member 
states, but also the relevant services at the European 
Parliament, the Committee of the Regions and the 
European Economic and Social Committee. The 
local and regional dimensions of the AFSJ could 
play a decisive role when monitoring 
                                                      
3 Term coined by José Manuel Barroso in his paper on the 
future of Europe, presented in May 2008, following a 
period of reflection intended to rebuild citizens’ 
confidence in the EU after the rejection of the proposed 
EU Constitution. 
4 European Commission, Communication on an Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice Serving the Citizen: Wider 
Freedom in a Safer Environment COM(2009) 262, 10 
June 2009. 
5 E. Guild, S. Carrera and A. Faure Atger, Challenges and 
prospects for the EU’s area of freedom, security and 
justice: Recommendations to the European Commission 
for the Stockholm Programme, CEPS Working 
Document No. 313, Centre for European Policy Studies, 
Brussels, April 2009.  
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implementation and results, as well as when 
examining the added value, social impacts and 
effectiveness of EU policies. It would be also 
necessary to ensure a partnership with EU agencies 
dealing with freedom, security and justice, e.g. the 
Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), the European 
Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), the European 
Ombudsman, etc. Transparent, formalised and open 
consultation mechanisms with other key 
stakeholders (practitioners at national and local 
levels), civil society organisations and academic 
networks should be further improved in AFSJ 
policies in order to better take on board their views 
and expertise. 
The ethical implications of the EU’s AFSJ policies 
should also be more carefully monitored, 
institutionalised and developed before moving the 
European policy agenda further forward. An 
example of this current shortcoming is given by the 
European Arrest Warrant, which was implemented 
prior to ensuring minimal common standards with 
respect to the rights of defence across the member 
states, thus putting some national authorities at risk 
of breaching their national constitutional obligations 
at times of transferring suspects. Even though the 
European system of fundamental human rights is 
already well developed, the full respect and 
protection of these rights at times of member states’ 
practical implementation of EU AFSJ law remains 
at stake and an issue of concern. Fundamental rights 
cannot be taken for granted in the EU and further 
strategies should be foreseen for the years to come. 
The Commission Communication does not develop 
a clear European strategy as to the precise ways in 
which a common area of fundamental rights could 
be further developed and evaluated both at EU 
institutional level (e.g. by strengthening and 
expanding the competences of the FRA) as well as 
by member states’ authorities while implementing 
and practising EU law. The text of the 
Communication fails to go beyond formalistic and 
official allusions to the existing system of tools and 
institutional structures in charge of fundamental 
rights and freedoms without presenting a proactive 
roadmap for the near future. 
Further, any new priorities, policies/laws or 
activities by EU agencies need to be carefully and 
independently assessed against the principles of 
cost-effectiveness and proportionality. This is 
particularly relevant in relation to current 
assumptions that specific political and social 
dilemmas can be reduced to technological solutions 
and the goal to develop a European Information 
Management Strategy. The 2008 Commission 
Communications on a new border package, the 
evaluation of FRONTEX and a proposal for a new 
external border management system illustrate the 
dynamism of European policies in the controlling of 
borders and in responding to the phenomenon of 
irregular immigration through the expanded use and 
development of new security technologies, 
European-wide surveillance systems and large-scale 
information systems/databases. Still, the proposed 
systems do not appear to stand up to the tests of 
proportionality, purpose limitation and 
reasonableness that are essential for any new EU 
legislation in light of the general principles of EU 
law. Indeed, their huge impact over the fundamental 
rights of protection of personal data and non-
discrimination will fundamentally transform the 
ways in which border controls take place in Europe 
and the position of the individual (and the 
effectiveness of current data protection systems) 
against these processes. 
Migration, integration and rights 
A serious deficit is currently apparent in the delivery 
of fundamental human rights in the EU, particularly 
in what concerns third-country nationals (nationals 
of countries outside the EU). Turning this rights 
gap around so that they are welcomed into the EU 
and enjoy security of residence and of rights in a 
framework of equality will be central for the success 
of the next AFSJ. With few related European 
measures adopted so far, legal migration remains 
high on the European Commission’s agenda. 
Among the five measures announced in the 2005 
Migration Policy Plan, only one – the least 
controversial on highly qualified employment – has 
so far been agreed to. To circumvent current 
obstacles, the Commission appears to have 
rehabilitated its original idea to create a single 
instrument: The Communication COM(2009) 262 
on an “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
serving the Citizen” of June 2009 proposes the 
creation of an Immigration Code to guarantee a 
“clear, transparent and equitable approach” to 
legal migration. This Code would aim at ensuring 
the respect for human rights of immigrants and 
would imply a return to the Tampere European 
Council Conclusions’ approach of securing a 
uniform level of rights between EU citizens and 
‘legally residing third-country nationals’.  
This initiative offers interesting opportunities as it 
creates a remarkable chance to finally create a 
single, unambiguous framework for migrants’ rights 
in the EU. The fragmented approach which until 
now characterises this policy field could in this way 
be resolved with the consolidation of all existing 
legislation into one sole common corpus of 
legislation. Similarly to the ways in which the 
adoption of the EU Schengen Borders Code has 
provided clearer rules and guarantees on border-
crossing, the adoption of an Immigration Code  
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could equally ensure more transparency and 
visibility of the European framework of rights for 
non-EU nationals residing in EU territory. In the 
context of the Global Approach to Migration, in 
particular, the Immigration Code could become a 
practical tool of external relations by formalising the 
EU’s position vis-à-vis migrants at times of 
establishing cooperation with third countries.  
Guaranteeing an equitable and secure status for 
third-country nationals migrating to and residing in 
the EU implies ensuring that they have access to the 
complete set of fundamental rights and guarantees 
provided under EU law. In addition, and in order to 
achieve its intended purpose, it would be necessary 
that any future Immigration Code would expressly 
refer to (and promote) existing international 
human rights instruments and conventions (e.g. 
United Nations, International Labour Organisation, 
Council of Europe, etc.), fundamental human rights 
obligations as well as the principles of non-
discrimination and proportionality. Finally, effective 
mechanisms to ensure their correct application 
should be foreseen and accessible to third-country 
nationals irrespective of their legal status and of the 
country they are in (within or outside the EU). A 
rights-based approach ensuring the principle of fair 
and equal treatment for all immigrants would indeed 
need to be the driving force of such an instrument. 
5. Foreign policy – Time to get 
organised 
Michael Emerson 
Assuming that the Lisbon Treaty will soon be 
ratified, it will be time for a step change in the 
organisation of the EU’s foreign and security policy. 
The immediate institutional changes should be of 
major systemic importance, the double-hatting of 
the High Representative as Vice-President of the 
Commission, the shaping of a common diplomatic 
service and creation of the post of permanent 
President of the European Council.  
How to follow through? We leave aside the 
unending flow of substantive foreign policy issues 
that these new or reformed structures will have to 
handle, and focus here just on making good the 
institutional innovations.  
The new High Representative, chairing the foreign 
ministers’ Council as well as serving as Vice-
President of the Commission, and will have 
extraordinary opportunities to develop his/her role. 
The first institutional task will be to sort out his/her 
position in relation to other members of the 
Commission. No-one will be able to fulfil this role 
however without a set of virtual deputies. Even if all 
members of the college of Commissioners will have 
equal votes in the deliberations of the Commission, 
such votes are hardly ever taken, and the main 
functional requirement will be for the Vice 
President to be able to rely upon his/her colleagues 
in the manner that is observable in any large foreign 
service: one or several deputy ministers for different 
geographical areas or sectors of policy, and separate 
ministers for development and trade policies.  
Second, the external action service will have to be 
created, combining the relevant parts of the Council 
Secretariat and the Commission’s Directorate-
General for External Relations. This will 
presumably be located physically or at least legally 
apart from either the Council or the Commission, 
and become their common property. The 
Commission’s 100 or more delegations worldwide 
will presumably be converted into EU delegations 
and see their political staff reinforced. This 
reinforcement will be coming in part from member 
state diplomatic services. The merger and 
reinforcement operation will be a task of exquisite 
bureaucratic complexity and take some time to settle 
down. Robust ground rules will be needed, notably 
to ensure a competitive and objective selection 
process, and the prerequisite that member state 
diplomats deployed into the service of the EU have 
adequate experience with EU affairs (for example, 
they must have served in a permanent representation 
in Brussels or one of the EU institutions for at least 
one posting). 
A third – less immediate but still overdue – task is 
to review comprehensively and bring into line with 
the new realities the EU’s representation in the 
multilateral organisations and fora. This is now in a 
state of appalling obsolescence. The EU is often 
underrepresented or even not represented at all, and 
member states massively overrepresented in our 
world of newly emerging global powers. In the less 
formally constituted institutions, the EU is 
adequately represented (G8, Middle East Contact 
Group etc.). But elsewhere it is either not 
represented at all (IMF, World Bank, UN Security 
Council), or only with observer status (e.g. in the 
OSCE, where the Vatican and various other micro-
states have higher status than the EU). For the IMF, 
the case for explicit representation for the eurozone 
is plausible, and for the World Bank and OSCE 
there should be full EU representation. Meanwhile 
member states are going to have their presence or 
weight diluted (we still observe the monumental 
absurdity of the Benelux constituency in the IMF 
enjoying a weight comparable to China). Where 
member states remain, there should be increasing 
recourse to constituency arrangements, with larger 
and fewer constituencies. The UN Security Council 
presents a particularly important and delicate case, 
with France and the UK jealously guarding their  
Time for Action – Immediate Priorities for the Next European Commission| 9 
privileged positions. One day UNSC reform should 
see one EU permanent member, but not tomorrow. 
So the search for more adequate intermediate 
solutions is needed: for example arrangements 
whereby common EU positions might be articulated 
from the seat of one of the two permanent members, 
who would be mandated to speak and indeed use 
his/her vote on behalf of the EU. The High 
Representative could be hosted in the delegation of 
one of the two permanent members for specific 
occasions, and entitled to speak from that seat. 
These are among the examples that need attention. 
The immediate step could still be to launch a 
comprehensive review of these issues of EU 
representation in the world’s multilateral system, 
since enlightened and effective multilateralism is 
among the main normative principles of the EU’s 
self-branding in international relations. It is time 
now to align the practice with the principles.  
6. Conclusion 
Daniel Gros & Julia De Clerck-
Sachsse 
The list of issues dealt with in this Policy Brief 
presents only a selection of the many areas where 
action is needed. In times of crisis, however, it is 
imperative to set priorities. A long wish list of areas 
where the EU should make progress is not useful in 
this context. The concrete proposals presented here 
for the areas of financial regulation, climate change 
and energy, justice and home affairs and foreign 
policy are meant to stimulate the efforts towards a 
concrete political programme for the next European 
Commission.  
The priorities presented here do not apply to the 
Commission alone. They constitute issues for the 
EU at large. We assumed throughout this exercise 
that the Treaty of Lisbon will enter into force. The 
implies that soon the Commission President will 
have an alter ego in the person of the newly created 
President of the European Council, a figure who is 
meant to lend more continuity and give a face to the 
EU abroad. A final priority for the new President of 
the Commission will thus be to coordinate his or her 
agenda with that of the President of the EU. 
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